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India took important steps in 2006 to develop its economy and improve its
standing abroad. Strengthening its strategic partnership with the United
States, while at the same time maintaining positive relations with China, was a
particularly important achievement. Increased attention to energy security has
driven India to reach out to countries well beyond its borders. For the first time
in India’s history, New Delhi appears comfortable using the military and diplo-
matic tools that great powers have used throughout history.
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Two thousand and six was a momentous year in India’s
quest to become a great power. After 59 years of existence, India is nearing the
status its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned at the time of Inde-
pendence when he said,
 
In regard to any major problem of a country or a group of countries of Asia, India
has to be considered. Whether it is a problem of defense or trade or industry or
economic policy, India cannot be ignored. She cannot be ignored, because . . . her
geographical position is a compelling reason. She cannot be ignored also, because
of her actual or potential power and resources. Whatever her actual strength may or
may not be, India is potentially a very powerful country and possesses the qualities





1. Nehru’s March 22, 1949, speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs appears in 
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 Today, every global power—including the United States and China—treats
India with the respect and consideration befitting a country that has posted an
average economic growth rate of more than 7% since 1994 and that plays an ac-
tive role in shaping a wide range of political, economic, and military issues both
in its immediate neighborhood and also, increasingly, well beyond its borders.
What was distinctive about India in 2006 was not just the progress that it
made in achieving its power potential—after all, India has been developing its
economic and military capabilities for years—but rather India’s willingness to
act as great powers do in applying the very military and diplomatic tools that the
superpowers flaunted during the Cold War and the European powers employed
before that. To use a colloquial phrase, India has long “talked the talk” of a big
power, but it has now started “walking the walk” as well. Also notable in 2006
was the palpable deference that other countries—big and small—have come to
show India mainly because of the lucrative trade and investment opportunities
that Indian corporations and state entities now offer.




 India will become a great power and
began to wonder what kind of great power it will become. Will India emulate
China and behave like a relatively apolitical economic powerhouse? Or will it
follow the U.S. lead by placing greater emphasis on strategic and ideological
objectives to enhance its overseas economic and political interests? Or will it
choose a third path? Even though its eventual policy orientation remains unclear,
it appears likely that India’s future position will depend more on the choices
New Delhi makes as an emerging big power and less on unwanted foreign pres-
sures. That said, three sizable challenges—stabilizing relations with Pakistan,
raising the domestic poverty line, and finding solutions to long-term water, energy,
and environmental problems—remain major barriers to Nehru’s abiding ambition





The socialist and nonaligned India of previous decades spurned commercial
connections with the world economy and avoided international commitments
that could entangle it in the global balance of power. In contrast, today’s India
embraces globalization, foreign engagement, and international power politics
as mechanisms for improving its national welfare and political might. Indian
policymakers have exhibited new measures of confidence, creativity, and asser-
tiveness in trying to enhance Indian interests in the four geostrategic contexts
that matter most to New Delhi. First, India has formed a strategic partnership
with the U.S. to give it greater influence on important international political,
economic, and security issues. Second, New Delhi has accelerated the process
initiated in 2003 to promote political cooperation with Beijing, thereby allowing
 
2. Ibid., p. 472.
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the two Asian giants to collaborate for mutual economic gain and ensure that
their long-standing border dispute and expanding international competition
for energy resources and trading markets remain demilitarized. Third, India
has embarked on a new “forward policy” to improve its standing in the “near
abroad”—a region of growing interest to New Delhi that spans the Indian Ocean
and includes parts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Central, Southwest, and
Southeast Asia. Fourth, in its immediate neighborhood India has worked to in-
sulate itself from the varied sources of extremism and instability that are sweep-
ing through Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
 
Strategic Partnership with 
the United States
 
After a long stretch of rocky relations with the U.S. during the Cold War and
in the decade following, India has finally become a key player in Washington’s
international security strategy. Ironically, the intense bilateral bargaining trig-
gered by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests revealed that New Delhi and Washing-
ton have many more interests in common than in the past. President Clinton’s
unanticipated support for India in the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan and
his visit to India in March 2000—the first by a U.S. president in 22 years—
accelerated this rapprochement, but it was President George W. Bush who truly
transformed the relationship between the U.S. and India. Banking on India’s
growing global power and looking for a counterweight to China in Asia, Bush
removed nuclear-related sanctions, approved defense technology cooperation,
accelerated bilateral trade and investment, and partnered with India in the “war
on terrorism.” India also departed from past patterns to embrace the U.S. For
example, New Delhi was an early supporter of the Bush administration’s missile
defense policy. It also participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghan-
istan by sending warships to escort U.S. supply ships through the Malacca
Strait in 2002; it nearly sent a division of combat troops to Iraq; and it twice
voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The most dramatic outcome of the enhanced partnership between the U.S.
and India was the civil nuclear cooperation deal announced by President Bush
and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005 and formalized when the
two leaders met in New Delhi in March 2006. India is legally considered to be
a “non-nuclear-weapon state” because it did not test a nuclear device prior to
1967, when the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was being negotiated. Thus, the
U.S. and the other nuclear technology exporters that make up the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group (NSG) cannot sell India even peaceful nuclear items because of
its weapons program. This has been a major irritant in U.S.-Indian relations
for decades. Accepting India’s logic that civil nuclear cooperation is the price
that must be paid for strategic engagement, Bush decided to reverse U.S. law
and NSG policy to permit reactor sales to India in exchange for its commitment
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to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place the former under
international safeguards. China, Pakistan, and several other countries—plus nu-
merous nonproliferation proponents—criticized the deal but, as 2006 drew
to a close, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation to enable the controversial
cooperation. The NSG will consider the matter in early 2007.
Despite the intense political wrangling over the nuclear deal in both capi-
tals, Washington and New Delhi managed to boost bilateral cooperation in
other areas during 2006. For example, economic interaction is growing rap-
idly. U.S. exports to India doubled from $4 billion in 2002 to $8 billion in
2005 and bilateral trade grew from $16 billion to $27 billion during the same
period. In 2006, U.S.-India trade exceeded $30 billion. Trade and investment
should accelerate even faster because India agreed in 2006 to lower tariffs on
industrial goods from 15% on average to 12.5%. India also agreed to extend
patent protection to pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, and various food
products. An April 2005 civil aviation agreement has increased the number of
flights and passengers traveling between the U.S. and India by more than 60%
in little over a year. Furthermore, the number of American students attending
Indian universities rose by 50% in 2005 and stood at 1,800 in 2006. There
were also close to 80,000 Indians studying in the United States in 2006, more
than from any other country. These are indications of the significant deepening
of bilateral relations over the last few years, especially in 2006.
Another area of deepening relations was civil space cooperation. India has
long coveted American space technology, but Washington had restricted In-
dia’s access to it because of concerns that it could be diverted for use in India’s
ballistic missile programs. In recent years, the two governments have ironed
out differences on this issue, and during Bush’s May 2006 visit they agreed to
have Indian space launch vehicles launch American satellites and satellites carry-
ing American components. Two months later, officials agreed to include two
U.S. scientific instruments on India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission, scheduled
for 2007. There also are plans to include Indian astronauts in U.S. astronaut-
training programs.
Security ties between India and the U.S. are expanding even faster. A new bi-
lateral defense framework signed in June 2005 charts a 10-year course for joint
and combined military exercises and exchanges, expanded defense trade, and new
opportunities for defense technology transfer, collaboration, and co-production.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review—which the Pentagon released in
February—identifies India as “a great power and a key strategic partner” and
one of a few emerging and major powers whose choices “will be key factors in
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phibious transport landing-dock ship—was readied for delivery to India. Dur-
ing the year, the Indian Navy sent over 300 personnel to Norfolk, Virginia, for





will inevitably be renamed by the Indian Navy, promises to be India’s second










 In 2006 the United States also delivered 10 of the 12 AN/
TPQ-37 Firefighter counter-battery radar sets ordered by India for $190 million
in 2002—the largest ever Indian purchase of U.S. military equipment. The
radar can pinpoint mortars, artillery, and rocket launchers up to 300 kilometers
away after tracking a shell for just a few seconds. Talks also progressed on the
sale of C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft, long-range patrol
aircraft, equipment for the Indian Special Forces, and various types of heli-
copters. As 2006 drew to a close, the Indian Air Force was finalizing a tender
for a $6 billion purchase of 126 multi-role combat jets, with the U.S.-made F-16
Falcon and F-18 Hornet aircraft regarded as the frontrunners.
At the eighth meeting of the senior U.S.-India Defense Policy Group held
in New Delhi in November, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric
Edelman and Indian Defense Secretary Shekhar Dutt agreed to upgrade joint
military exercises from the present level of platoons and companies to more
integrated battalion-level and command-post engagements. After conducting
over 40 exercises in the past five years to improve Indian and U.S. military inter-
operability, the new emphasis will be on multi-level military maneuvers involving
all three services and having a mix of commands. An example is the U.S.-India
Shatrujeet urban commando exercise that took place in southern India in Oc-
tober and was linked to the annual Malabar naval exercises. Future joint exer-
cises are planned for high-altitude maneuvers in Uttaranchal and Alaska and
will involve troops from various military commands and services. In the past,
the Indian military has always interacted with the U.S. Pacific Command, but
in a significant policy change that demonstrates India’s increased importance
to the United States, India will also be allowed to coordinate with U.S. Central
Command and Strategic Command in the future.
 
Cooperation and Competition with China
 
Even as its defense ties with the U.S. deepen, India insists that China is not the
target of this military alliance. Speaking in Shanghai in January 2006, Indian
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran stated that India and China “are too big to con-
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New Delhi and Beijing accelerated the trend started in the early 1990s of im-
proving bilateral relations, despite a long history of friction and the presence
of several conflicting interests. The greatest source of tension has been a terri-
torial dispute that caused a brief but intense border war in 1962. India claims
about 15,000 square miles of land that China occupies in Kashmir, while China
lays claim to a 35,000 square mile region in the northeastern Indian state of
Arunachal Pradesh. During a landmark 1993 visit to Beijing, Indian Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao agreed to demilitarize the Line of Actual Control that
divides the two sides’ forces at the disputed border. Since then, joint border
working groups have met periodically. A significant breakthrough was made
during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s April 2005 visit to India when an agree-
ment was reached on the “political parameters and guiding principles” for re-
solving the border issue. As per this agreement, China implicitly accepted
Indian sovereignty over the former kingdom of Sikkim, while India reaffirmed
China’s claim to Tibet. Since then, however, the border talks have stalled.
Among other contentious issues are Beijing’s continued military and eco-
nomic aid to Pakistan, including for its strategic weapons programs; China’s
construction of military and intelligence facilities around the Indian Ocean; com-
petition for energy resources in Myanmar and other oil- and gas-producing
countries; and China’s growing economic penetration of South and Southeast
Asia. For example, China recently replaced India as Bangladesh’s biggest trad-
ing partner. Chinese President Hu Jintao also signed a free trade agreement
with Pakistan in November 2006 that is expected to increase Sino-Pakistani
trade nearly four times to $15 billion over the next five years. When it starts in
2010, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) will unite 1.7 bil-
lion people in a single market worth nearly $2 trillion. While India remains on
the sidelines, China will soon become ASEAN’s single largest trading partner,
with commerce reaching $160 billion in 2006 and probably $200 billion in
2007, compared to India’s projected $30 billion trade in 2007.
Despite their differences, India and China have agreed to move ahead on
other fronts. For example, the world’s two fastest growing energy consumers
agreed in January 2006 to cooperate on foreign energy exploration and devel-
opment, even after India lost out to China on large energy projects in Angola,
Myanmar, Ecuador, and Kazakhstan. That month India’s state-run Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and the China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion jointly purchased assets in Syria’s al-Furat oilfields for $573 million. These
two firms are already working together in Sudan’s Muglad Basin to pump oil
and construct a 940-mile pipeline to transport it to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
Sino-Indian commerce is skyrocketing. Bilateral trade reached $20 billion in
2006—a fourfold increase from 2002. During Hu Jintao’s visit to New Delhi
in November 2006—the first by a Chinese leader in 10 years—the neighbors
pledged to double bilateral trade to $40 billion by 2010. China is already
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India’s second largest trading partner, though China’s trade with the U.S. is
still 10 times larger than its commerce with India. Hu and Manmohan Singh
agreed to encourage investment flows, diversify trade, and hasten joint efforts
to secure foreign energy resources, but no free trade agreement was discussed
largely because of Indian concerns about its own industrial competitiveness. A
hotline was set up for the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers to stay in regu-
lar contact, and summit meetings between the president and prime minister
were scheduled to occur on an annual basis. In addition, Hu announced his in-
tent to initiate civil nuclear cooperation with India although he gave no public
indication if China, an NSG member, would support the U.S. initiative to exempt
India from NSG export controls.
During Hu’s visit, Indian and Chinese policymakers discussed the prospects
of holding their own joint military exercises. The two countries’ navies con-
ducted a bilateral exercise off the Kochi coast in the Arabian Sea in December
2005, but there have been no combined air or ground force maneuvers yet.
Indian army chief General J. J. Singh stated that he was studying the subject
closely, explaining: “Right now, we are at the stage of getting to know each
other better. We have to have language compatibility, and also discuss the methods




 A major obstacle to enhanced
Sino-Indian military ties is Indian defense planners’ concerns about China’s ris-
ing military power and its construction of military facilities along the border—





 Also troubling is China’s so-called “string of pearls” strategy to
establish naval bases stretching from Southeast Asia to Somalia, including fa-
cilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, the Maldivian island of Marao, Chittagong in
Bangladesh, and Myanmar’s Great Coco Island.
 
Greater Assertiveness in the Near Abroad
 
New Delhi is trying to develop increased maritime access all along the Indian
Ocean littoral and deepen relations with other navies in the region both to
counter China’s increased international activism and ensure India’s continued
access to overseas commodities. Among the plans Indian policymakers discussed
in 2006 were the creation of intelligence monitoring posts in the Maldives and
Madagascar, as well as construction of a maritime facility on the remote Aga-
lega islands, 500 miles off the Mauritius coast. These efforts are prioritized to
counter what India’s newly appointed naval chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, de-
scribed as China’s strategy to shape the “maritime battlefield” in the region:
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If you don’t have the capability to operate in [distant] waters for a length of time,
then you need friends who will support your cause when the time comes, so defi-
nitely China is doing that, as there are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka,
and down below Africa. So it is a known fact that we are ringed by states which may




Partially as a response to this potential threat, the Indian Navy plans to acquire
42 modern ships—including two aircraft carriers—to handle coastal defense
and provide the blue-water capability required to protect the country’s grow-
ing overseas trade and energy access.
Energy security is a big and growing issue for India. To fuel the country’s
rapidly expanding economy, twice as much oil was used in 2005 (2.5 million
barrels per day) as in 1992. This figure is estimated to double again by 2030. A
major problem for India is that it produces less than one-fourth of its oil re-
quirements. For this reason, since 2000 it has made overseas equity investments
in oil and gas projects worth $3.5 billion in 20 countries, including Russia’s
Sakhalin Island, Indonesia, Vietnam, Venezuela, Iran, and Algeria. However,
China still leads the way with over $40 billion invested in overseas energy since
2000 and 500,000 barrels of foreign equity oil produced each day in 2006. In
addition to investing in military means to protect the shipment of vital energy
products to India, New Delhi is also now using a variety of diplomatic tools to




In the Middle East, India’s closest partner in terms of security affairs is not an
oil-producing state; rather, it is Israel. Ever since the two countries established
diplomatic relations in 1992, bilateral political, commercial, and military ties
have flourished. Israel is now India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia.
In recent years, Tel Aviv has supplied the Indian armed forces with unmanned
aerial vehicles, Barak surface-to-air naval missiles, Greenpine radar systems,
and Phalcon airborne warning and control systems, just to name a few of the
publicly announced defense deals. There is also significant intelligence shar-
ing between Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, and the Indian Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), especially on Islamic extremism and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
India has had an economic presence in the Persian Gulf for many years.
Nearly five million Indian workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries send home about $4 billion in remittances every year. Indian com-
merce with these nations is growing too. The GCC, as a collective entity, ranks
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as India’s second biggest trading partner largely because of oil imports, which
reached $20 billion in 2006. In the same year, India’s state-owned oil company,
ONGC, initiated a $20 million project to develop Qatar’s offshore Najwat Najem
oilfield.
Topping that, the state-run Indian Oil Corporation won a $3 billion deal to
develop part of Iran’s huge South Pars gasfield and construct two liquefaction
plants in southern Iran that will produce about nine million tons of liquid nat-
ural gas (LNG) for India and other recipients. India also has other energy deals
with Iran and has proposed a gas pipeline running from Iran to India via Paki-
stan, with a possible extension from Pakistan to China. Construction on the $7
billion project was supposed to begin in 2007, but Iran’s insistence in July
2006 that it required $7.20 per million cubic meters of LNG compared to India’s
offer of $4.20 slowed the negotiations. Apart from energy commerce, Indian-
Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan and possibly on the future of Pakistan should
keep bilateral relations strong, notwithstanding U.S. pressure on New Delhi to
take a hard line on Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. India will go to great
lengths to assert its foreign policy independence even as strategic relations with
Washington deepen. Underscoring this point, Manmohan Singh decided to at-
tend the Nonaligned Movement summit in Havana in September 2006 instead
of meeting President Bush at the United Nations in New York.
India’s efforts to improve its standing in the Middle East received a major
boost during the July Israel-Lebanon conflict, when the Indian Navy under-
took its largest-ever overseas civil evacuation operation. With U.S. support, four
Indian naval ships evacuated over 2,280 persons including 436 Sri Lankans,
69 Nepalis, and seven Lebanese citizens. The navy had earlier revealed its ca-
pacity for large-scale relief operations by carrying over 910 tons of provisions




India is also quickly moving into Central Asia to secure new energy resources
and strengthen its geostrategic position. This includes seeking access to Kazakh
oil and gas. In particular India is promoting pipelines from Turkmenistan through
both Afghanistan and Pakistan into India. It also wishes to see pipelines built
from Iran to India. New Delhi’s relations with Tajikistan were recently boosted
by Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov’s five-day visit to India in August 2006.
India is now reportedly completing construction of three hangars at Ayni Air-
base near the Tajik capital Dushanbe. The Indian Air Force will station a dozen
MiG-29 jets there and will train the Tajik air force. India’s immediate objectives
are to increase its profile in Afghanistan, counter Pakistani influence there, and
monitor anti-India activities in both nearby Pakistan and China. Over the hori-
zon, the Ayni base will allow India to project power throughout Central Asia.
In July India also attended its first session (as an oberver, with Iran, Pakistan,
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and Mongolia) of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization




Over 40% of India’s rapidly expanding trade passes through the Malacca Straits.
Thus, India has a major interest in securing the safety of shipping through this
vital waterway by increasing its naval presence and strengthening relations
with neighboring countries. Fortunately for New Delhi, India’s growing eco-
nomic power and historical connections to Southeast Asia make it an attractive
counterweight to China’s ever stronger political and military might in the re-
gion. For example, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam—all of which
have territorial disputes with China—now have expanding, multi-faceted rela-
tions with New Delhi. The Indian Navy is especially active in the region. Some
of its many activities include conducting regular discussions with other navies
in the area for the security of sea lanes and other issues; coordinating port calls
and naval patrols; exchanging information on merchant traffic in the Indian
Ocean; training officers and sailors from other countries in Indian professional
schools; and participating in multilateral exercises conducted by the Southeast
Asian navies and also in waters around Southeast Asia itself. In February and
March, the Indian and Singaporean Navies conducted a 10-day exercise off
India’s eastern seaboard, their 13th such annual engagement and one of the
largest of the year by the Indian Navy.
 
Insulation from Instability in
Neighboring Countries
 
Much of India’s immediate neighborhood experienced volatility and the rise
of different forms of extremism in 2006. Still feeling the sting of its disastrous
1987 military intervention in Sri Lanka, India has pursued quiet diplomacy
aimed at insulating itself from regional instability instead of playing an active
role in tackling the sources of this violence and hostility directly. India’s rela-
tionship with Sri Lanka (q.v.) is complicated by the island’s civil war, which
is, in part, fueled by the many ethnic Tamils living in southern India. Thus the
conflict also poses potential domestic political problems for India. Although
there has been a formal ceasefire in the ethnic struggle between the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, commonly known as the “Tamil Tigers”) and
the Sri Lankan government since 2002, violence escalated dramatically in 2006.
Despite overtures from both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, India
has avoided direct involvement or intervention, relying instead on the inter-
national community in trying to bring peace to Sri Lanka.
India’s relationship with Nepal (q.v.) has been strained by a decade-old in-
surgency by Maoist rebels intent on setting up a communist republic in the
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country. King Gyanendra, part of a hereditary monarchy that has ruled Nepal
for most of its known history, assumed absolute power in a royal coup in Feb-
ruary 2005. However, the king was forced to step down from power in April
2006 after huge popular protests in Kathmandu and intense pressure from the
international community, including India. In November, government represen-
tatives and the rebels signed a comprehensive peace accord that paved the way
for the Maoists to disarm and join the government. Facing its own Maoist in-
surgency, India called the settlement a “victory for the Nepali people” and prob-
ably will continue to play a low-key role in promoting implementation of the
peace process.
The political situation in another Indian neighbor, Bangladesh (q.v.), turned
violent after Khaleda Zia completed her five-year term as prime minister in
October and handed power to a caretaker authority pending elections in early
2007. Although the Bangladeshi economy has improved, Zia’s government was
criticized for corruption and turning a blind eye to Islamic extremism. In early
2006, strong international pressure and the threat of disruption of international
aid forced the government to take action against the extremists. Nonetheless,
the lack of economic and political development in Bangladesh remains a seri-
ous concern for India particularly because of the growing number of poverty-
stricken Bangladeshis who cross into India illegally every year. Border agents
occasionally exchange small arms fire, and India is in the process of construct-
ing a fence to help stop unauthorized immigration. Another concern for New
Delhi is China’s increasing economic and military presence in Bangladesh. In
March China donated police equipment and sold 16 F-7 fighter aircraft to Ban-
gladesh. In return, Dhaka granted Beijing exploration rights for developing its
natural gasfields and offered China naval access to its Chittagong Port, which
India has long coveted. India will continue to court Bangladesh because ac-
cess to Myanmar’s rich gas reserves depends on Dhaka’s willingness to allow
a pipeline to cross its territory into India.
India’s wariness about Chinese penetration into South Asia is especially acute
when it comes to Pakistan, India’s longstanding military rival and China’s depend-
able strategic partner. After Hu Jintao visited India in November, he traveled to
Pakistan to sign a free trade agreement and defense and civil nuclear accords.
Hu called Pakistan an “indispensable partner,” subtly referring to its geographic
location, which facilitates China’s connectivity to the Islamic world, notably
the Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan’s political and military power also
offers China a counterweight to India, notably in regional organizations such
as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), ASEAN,
and the SCO. After narrowly avoiding a major war with Pakistan in 2002,
India has pursued a composite peace dialogue with its estranged neighbor over
the past few years. But, this process was severely disrupted as a result of the
July 2006 Mumbai train bombings, in which 186 people were killed. New Delhi
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blamed Pakistan-based militant groups for these blasts. In November the Indian
and Pakistani joint secretaries reached agreement on a joint anti-terror panel
that could possibly lead to improved information-sharing and more effective






After assuming power in 2004, India’s Congress Party-led coalition government
has achieved remarkable political stability. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
who made his reputation as a reform-oriented finance minister in the 1990s, is a
champion of economic liberalization. In part because of Singh’s market-friendly
policies, India now has one of the world’s fastest growing economies, with 8.5%
gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2005 and a projected 7.7% average
annual growth through 2009. In October 2006, the benchmark Sensex Index of
the Bombay Stock Exchange topped the 13,000 mark for the first time. Despite
this economic success, 29% (350 million to 400 million) of India’s nearly 1.1
billion people still live below the poverty line; more than 40% of the popula-
tion is illiterate. The World Bank estimates that nine out of 10 Indian workers
lack access to the country’s rapidly growing services and high tech jobs.
India’s swelling population is wreaking havoc on the country’s environment.
Urbanization, industrialization, and skyrocketing energy consumption are dam-
aging air quality and causing deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution, land
degradation, and strain on the municipal services of all major cities. New Delhi,
Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata rank among the world’s largest and most pol-
luted cities because of heavy industrial pollution and the rapidly rising number
of vehicles on the roads. Of the three million premature deaths that occur world-
wide each year because of air pollution, the highest number is reported in
India. Water shortages also continue to be a major problem and the govern-
ment is actively building dams in the Kashmir region to store water and help
with increasing energy needs.
In conclusion, India took great strides in 2006 in becoming a “big power” in
the international arena, but it also faces significant challenges on the domestic
front. In particular, New Delhi will need to reduce poverty and pollution while
at the same time develop new sources of energy for its rapidly growing popu-
lation and economy. This will be required in order to truly achieve the status
that Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned for India as one of the world’s truly great
economic and political powers.
